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With the Texas Central’s high-speed rail fast approaching in Texas, legisla-
tors have been presented with an opportunity to reform Texas’ eminent do-
main laws. The controversial urban-versus-rural project has brought eminent
domain policy to the limelight. The Texas Legislature can capitalize on les-
sons learned from the State’s bout with the Trans-Pecos Pipeline by protecting
condemnees and incentivizing good faith efforts by condemnors.
This Article proposes five possible reforms for eminent domain law in
Texas. First, the Texas Legislature should protect condemnees by aligning
their appraisal disclosure requirements with condemnors, who have no duties
to disclose appraisals. Second, legislative changes would allow attorney’s fees
to be awarded to a condemnee when a condemnor’s offer is significantly lower
than the actual value of the property. Third, legislative changes would inform
condemnees of exactly which pieces of land that condemnors have the power
to take when condemnors make their offer. Fourth, this Article proposes sensi-
ble protections for Texas homesteads. Last, this Article explores legislative
and judicial blocks that can be used by opponents of the rail.
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I. BACKGROUND
As the Texas Central Railway (“TCR”) moves closer to breaking
ground on its 240-mile, high-speed rail project that is set to cut
through the heart of Central Texas, eminent domain has become an
even more contentious issue for rural Texans and their representa-
tives.1 Eminent domain is an especially painful thought for them be-
cause they will bear the cost and inconvenience of a project that is
primarily intended to benefit those in cities.2 For those living in and
around Houston and Dallas, TCR aims to provide a safe, efficient,
and quick mode of transportation between the two metropolitan ar-
eas.3 As it stands, the TCR likely could invoke the harsh doctrine of
eminent domain.4 However, this note will record, among other pro-
posed and possible pro-landowner legislative solutions, a statutory in-
terpretation that courts could use to block the TCR’s eminent domain
authority.
The TCR’s status as a private entity adds another level of contro-
versy. The land at issue is mostly used for farming, and a train would
present unique challenges for landowners. These landowners may
have their land divided by a railroad, which would only allow land-
owners to cross in certain areas.5 This potential physical division of
property has created more hostility for the project amongst landown-
ers and distinguishes the project from other less invasive uses of emi-
nent domain. For example, power lines do not divide property at
ground level, and traditional railroads do not always require fencing
on either side of the track like the TCR has proposed.6 The TCR has
responded to this criticism by theorizing that the train could sit on
pedestals, forty feet high in some areas, but has not committed to the
1. See Brandon Formby & Sanya Mansoor, Opponents of Proposed Dallas-Hous-




3. The Project, TEX. CENT., http://www.texascentral.com/project/ [https://perma
.cc/5T6N-YV6E] (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
4. Frances Tubb, Full Speed Ahead: The Texas Central High-Speed Rail and the
Sacrifice Required From Residents of Rural Texas, 49 TEX. TECH L. REV. 547, 590
(2017).
5. See The Project, supra note 3.
6. See Formby & Mansoor, supra note 1.
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idea, citing a pending environmental review.7 Additionally, legislators
have attempted to mandate that the rail must be constructed on such
pedestals.8
The heart of the eminent domain issue is a landowner’s right to ex-
clusively possess their land. Land is a uniquely finite resource that can
have both real9 and sentimental10 value. This value is essentially infi-
nite because the land, if protected and used properly, can provide
value to a family for generations. Texas’s public policy largely favors
landowners, and the state recognizes families who have owned and
operated a continuous agricultural operation for 100 years or more
through its Family Land Heritage Program.11 The program has recog-
nized over 4,700 farms and ranches in 242 counties.12 In general, 86%
of Texas land is used for agricultural production, with 98.5% of agri-
cultural operations being run by individuals or families.13 The uncer-
tainty surrounding high-speed rail has already imposed burdens on
some of these farms; even the prospect of the rail coming through
property has already deterred some farmers from making improve-
ments.14 Texas’s recognition of historic rights of landowners has led
the state to adopt policies that protect the right of landowners—rural
and otherwise.
Condemnation is a process of setting apart or expropriating prop-
erty for public use in the exercise of eminent domain.15 The use of
condemnation is considered a “derogation of rights” in Texas because
it forces landowners to accept a price for their land, whether or not
they always agree to it.16 For this reason, the Texas Supreme Court
has mandated that eminent domain laws should be construed strictly
in favor of the landowner.17 This strict view of statutes applies regard-




9. The Scarcity of Land, ECONOMIST (June 18, 2009), https://www.economist
.com/blogs/freeexchange/2009/06/the_scarcity_of_land [https://perma.cc/N2FW-4ZQ
H].
10. Some Factors That Influence The Value of Land, FISHER STARK, https://fisher
stark.com/some-factors-that-influence-the-value-of-land/ [https://perma.cc/9M84-QF5
J] (last updated July 5, 2015).
11. The Family Land Heritage Program, TEX. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.texasagri
culture.gov/NewsEvents/FamilyLandHeritage.aspx [https://perma.cc/HSX7-WDVU]
(last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
12. Texas Agriculture Facts, TEX. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.texasagriculture.gov/
Portals/0/DigArticle/1930/Ag%20Week%20Fact%20Sheet%203%2013%2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JMP9-H249] (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
13. Id.
14. Formby & Mansoor, supra note 1.
15. Condemnation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
16. Burch v. City of San Antonio, 518 S.W. 2d 540, 545 (Tex. 1975).
17. Id.
18. Id.
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While landowners are rightfully concerned with their compensation
and rights during the eminent domain process, eminent domain is jus-
tified as a necessary tool for growth. Consider the government’s use of
eminent domain to construct airports,19 engage in conservation ef-
forts,20 or fight wars.21 Although the high-speed rail’s economic im-
pact and public benefit are uncertain, the TCR argues that the project
will have “substantial and long-lasting positive impact[s].”22 The TCR
cites jobs, tax revenue, economic development, and a reduction in
traffic as public benefits stemming from the project.23
Nevertheless, many have argued that the project is not economi-
cally feasible. For example, Texas Representative Cecil Bell Jr. thinks
that the train will leave Texans “foot[ing] the bill” by bailing out the
railroad once it fails.24 His ideas may have significant merit. An inde-
pendent study on a similar project in California found that the state
had grossly underestimated operating costs.25 Consequently, the study
concluded that taxpayers may be left with paying billions more than
the forecasted amount per year.26 Thus, funding the rail is a legitimate
concern for Texans. However, basic free-market principles suggest
that a private company would not enter into a multi-billion-dollar in-
vestment just to fail. As TCR managing director of external affairs
said in December 2018:
When you have a project that is not government-driven, you have
the discipline of following the data. This project works because [it
is] in the sweet spot of the too far to drive, too short to fly. [It has] a
strong market.27
In Texas’ 85th Legislative Session, lawmakers addressed this concern
with varying levels of support from the rest of the Legislature.
Others have argued that the technology is not innovative or novel
enough, and that bigger and better opportunities are just beyond the
horizon. In Elon Musk’s 2013 paper, Hyperloop Alpha, Musk voiced
significant displeasure with disappointment that California, the home
of Silicon Valley and technological innovation, approved a train that is
19. See, e.g., Cameron Dev. Co. v. United States, 145 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1944).
20. See, e.g., Gwathmey v. United States, 215 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1954).
21. See, e.g., Sharp v. United States, 191 U.S. 341 (1903).
22. Discover the Benefits, TEX. CENT. RAILWAY, http://www.texascentral.com/ben
efits/ [https://perma.cc/V74L-GHCL] (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
23. Id.
24. Texas High Speed Rail Facts and Information, CECIL BELL, JR., http://www.ce
cilbelljr.com/hsr/ [https://perma.cc/G22X-CKQG] (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
25. Ralph Vartabedian, Bullet Train Authority Underestimates Operating Costs,
Study Says, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/24/local/
la-me-0423-bullet-subsidy-20120424 [https://perma.cc/G6UZ-ZW4H].
26. Id.
27. Matt Zdun, Dallas-Houston Bullet Train Critics Want to Boost Texas Oversight
of Eminent Domain Use, TEX. TRIB. (Dec. 13, 2018, 12 AM), https://www.texastribune
.org/2018/12/13/dallas-houston-bullet-train-critics-want-texas-oversee-eminent-do
main/ [https://perma.cc/5ZDB-TR5P].
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“one of the most expensive per mile and one of the slowest in the
world.”28 In lieu of high-speed rail, Musk proposed the Hyperloop: a
near-vacuum sealed tube with a pod travelling almost 700 miles per
hour that can span thousands of miles.29 With this technology, Musk
proposed a New York-Washington D.C. Hyperloop that will transport
passengers between the two cities in twenty-nine minutes.30 Musk
plans to build the Hyperloop by contracting with the Boring Com-
pany—a company that builds massive tunnels for roadways, rails, and
Hyperloops.31Although his 2013 paper indicated that he was not
interested in pursuing the initiative, Musk claimed that in 2017 he re-
ceived “verbal [government approval] to build the New York-D.C.
Hyperloop.”32 Later, officials disputed this claim.33
This issue has divided Texas by pitting rural residents against those
in larger cities. At the heart of the issue, for opponents of the railroad
project, is eminent domain. This Article will focus on sensible, non-
controversial reforms that both rural and urban citizens should agree
on. These reforms include the following: (1) due process protections
for landowners before condemnation proceedings; (2) attorney’s fees
for plaintiffs who are offered an unreasonably low dollar amount for
their land; and (3) specific requirements for companies making offers
to purchase land that are designed to prevent landowners from unwit-
tingly selling more land than required under Texas law. Additionally,
this Article will outline legislative and judicial tools individuals seek-
ing to block the train outright, although these measures are unlikely to
succeed.
Importantly, if Texas adopts these eminent domain reforms, the
benefit will not only extend to those affected by the TCR project; the
proposals will affect all projects that involve eminent domain. Texas’s
hesitancy regarding the TCR project is reminiscent of Texas’s previous
tussle with the now complete Trans-Pecos Pipeline.34 As with the high-
speed rail, the Trans-Pecos Pipeline was resisted by communities that
28. Hyperloop Alpha, SPACE X 1 (2013), https://www.spacex.com/sites/spacex/
files/hyperloop_alpha-20130812.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQ89-EY8V] (last visited Feb.
4, 2019).
29. Id. at 3
30. Correct citation: Danielle Muoio, Everything we know about Elon Musk’s am-
bitious Hyperloop plan, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 17, 2017, 9:51 AM), http://www.business
insider.com/elon-musk-hyperloop-plan-boring-company-2017-8.
31. Id.
32. Dominic Rushe, Elon Musk Unveils Plans for Hyperloop Transport System,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 13, 2013, 5:09 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/
aug/12/elon-musk-unveils-hyperloop-transport [https://perma.cc/GS6J-HLCY]; Julia
Carrie Wong & Sam Levin, Elon Musk: I Got ‘Government Approval’ for New York-
DC Hyperloop. Officials: No He Didn’t, GUARDIAN (July 20, 2017, 4:07 PM), https://
www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/20/elon-musk-hyperloop-verbal-govern
ment-approval [https://perma.cc/A754-6GJV].
33. Wong & Levin, supra note 32.
34. See David Hunn, With Trans-Pecos Pipeline Done, Protests Dwindle, HOUS-
TON CHRON., http://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/article/With-Trans-Pecos-
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it affected by the pipeline.35 Once the pipeline’s construction began,
landowners received unfair treatment throughout the process; some
condemnation proceedings found that landowners received offers
from the state for their land that were thirty times less than offers
from the condemning company.36
If the Texas Legislature learns anything from the Trans-Pecos Pipe-
line, then the state should take appropriate steps to mitigate the dam-
age caused by eminent domain. With high-speed rail coming down the
line at breakneck speed, eminent domain reform is an important pol-
icy goal for rural Texans who are affected by the project. The reforms
proposed below are intended to protect the interests of landowners
during the proceedings but will not stop the TCR from the completion
of the project. However, a full understanding of these reforms re-
quires comprehension of Texas’s eminent domain authority under the
United States Constitution, self-imposed eminent domain limitations,
and eminent domain condemnation proceedings.
II. A SURVEY OF EMINENT DOMAIN LAW
A. Federal and Constitutional Law: Deference to the States
Texas derives its eminent domain authority from the United States
Constitution but limits its authority in the Texas Constitution by dis-
missing the newfound expansion of what constitutes a public use in
Kelo, which is a United States Supreme Court case that allows takings
for purely economic purposes.
1. United States Constitutional Authority
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution is the basis
for eminent domain takings; the provision gives owners the right to
just compensation when their property is taken for a public use.37 In
Kohl v. United States, the United States Supreme Court concluded
that the broad wording of the Fifth Amendment and the incorporation
of the Bill of Rights by the Fourteenth Amendment grants the power
to exercise eminent domain to the states.38 Further, the Court deter-
mined that eminent domain authority “is essential to [the govern-
ment’s] independent existence and perpetuity.”39 In Berman v.
Parker, the Court inferred that the term “public use” is synonymous
pipeline-done-protests-dwindle-11047601.php [https://perma.cc/9QC8-ZM8L] (last
updated Apr. 4, 2017, 9:32 AM).
35. Id.
36. Naveena Sadasivam, Big Bend Landowners Awarded Millions Over Pipeline,
but the Fight Isn’t Over Yet, TEX. OBSERVER, (Jun. 14, 2016, 5:42 PM), https://www
.texasobserver.org/trans-pecos-eminent-domain/ [https://perma.cc/CP5E-ZGMC] (last
visited Jan. 27, 2018).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
38. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 372 (1875).
39. Id. at 371.
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with the term “public purpose,” and that the government could exer-
cise eminent domain authority in a program that transferred property
from one private party to another in a redevelopment program in
Washington D.C.40 Importantly, Berman established that states should
receive a high level of deference when deciding what constitutes a
public use—a precedent that is still adhered to by courts.41
2. Kelo and the Expansion of “Public Use”
In Kelo v City of New London, the United States Supreme Court
upheld a use of eminent domain that is the most far-reaching defini-
tion of public use to date. In that case, the City of New London at-
tempted to exercise eminent domain by allowing a private
pharmaceutical company to condemn properties for an “integrated
development plan designed to revitalize its ailing economy.”42 The
city justified the condemnations under a statute establishing that the
taking of properties for an economic development project was both
for public use and of interest to the public.43 The Court justified its
decision by citing the high deference given to state governments in
deciding public use as established in Berman.
The dissenting justices in Kelo—O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas—
argued that the majority in Kelo “abandons [the] long-held, basic limi-
tation on government power” that property should not be taken for
the benefit of the taker.44 In the view of these justices, all property in
the United States is endangered by actors who pledge to improve
lands taken or intended beneficial public use in ways that the state
legislature approves.45
3. The Texas Constitution—Dismissing Kelo
Article I, section 17(a) of the Texas Constitution allows for the tak-
ings of property (1) for public use, so long as it is incidental use, by the
State, its political subdivision, the public at large, or an entity granted
eminent domain authority by the State; and (2) to eliminate “urban
blight on a particular parcel of property.”46 The following provision,
section 17(b), is the Texas Legislature’s reaction to Kelo. In 2009,
Texas passed the Limitations on Use of Eminent Domain Act, which
called for a referendum that would forbid using eminent domain for
purely economic purposes or to enhance tax revenue.47 Then later
40. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
41. See id.
42. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
43. Id. at 476.
44. Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
45. Id.
46. TEX. CONST. art 1, § 17(a).
47. Montana J. Ware, Private Takings in Texas: Defining “Public Use” After Kelo,
12 TEX. J. OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. 259, 264 (2017).
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that year, Texas voters approved the constitutional amendment. This
amendment effectively changed the Texas Constitution so that the leg-
islature cannot expand statutory authority under the new rule in Kelo.
Thus, eminent domain in Texas can only be exercised for a public use
other than mere economic development. Accordingly, the controver-
sial Kelo decision has no actual effect on Texas law.
B. Texas Law: A Narrower Approach
Texas has several statutory provisions relevant to the use of eminent
domain by the TCR.48 First, Texas railroads have statutory eminent
domain authority. Second, Texas outlines the procedures and duties
that condemnors must follow during eminent domain proceedings.
1. Railroads’ Statutory Authority
Section 112.002(b) of the Texas Transportation Code grants Texas
railroad companies the right to exercise eminent domain and to
purchase, hold, and use all property as necessary for the construction
of railways, stations, and other accommodations.49 Railroads must
demonstrate that the land is required for the construction of a right-
of-way, depot, station building, or any other purchase necessary for
the operation of a railroad; provided that the condemned property is
located within two miles of the company’s right-of-way.50 If the con-
demned property is no longer needed for railway use, then the railway
company has the right to convey property freely.51 Agents of a rail-
road have the right to enter a landowner’s property exclusively to se-
lect the most efficient route for the railway, but may not enter the
land in order to condemn the property or for any other purpose.52
Land condemned by a railroad company is not held as a fee simple
estate; the condemnation and taking of the land only grants the rail-
road a right-of-way easement in gross.53 Once this easement is ac-
quired, the railroad has the exclusive right to use the surface land.54
Additionally, any land condemned by a railroad may be used only for
purposes of the railroad.55 Although a landowner may own the fee
simple subservient estate that a railroad company has obtained a
right-of-way on, the statutes prohibit a landowner from exercising
mineral rights.56
48. In this writing sample, only two of the provisions are covered.
49. TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 112.002(b)(5), (6) (West 2009).
50. Id. § 112.053.
51. Id. § 112.002(b)(6).
52. Id. § 112.051.
53. Id. § 112.055.
54. State v. Beeson, 232 S.W.3d 265, 277 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007 pet. dism’d).
55. Calcasieu Lumber Co. v. Harris, 13 S.W. 453, 454 (Tex. 1890).
56. Brightwell v. International-Great Northern R. Co., 49 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Tex.
1932).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\5-3\TWR309.txt unknown Seq: 9 15-APR-19 14:39
2019] HIGH-SPEED RAIL 909
After a piece of land is condemned for a right-of-way, a condemnor
may fence off the right of way.57 Landowners may acquire easements
across a fenced right-of-way by prescription58 or by necessity.59 Fur-
ther, landowners may be awarded damages if the railroad’s right-of-
way interferes with the landowner’s access to property.60 Other dam-
ages caused to a landowner’s property by the use of the right-of-way
may also be assessed as damages.61 However, courts have held that
the operation of a railroad on one’s property is not a nuisance.62
Texas does not allow attorney’s fees in eminent domain proceed-
ings.63 In Texas, attorney’s fees can only be awarded if expressly au-
thorized by contract or statute.64 In City of San Antonio v. El Dorado
Amusement Co., the Court refused to award attorney’s fees to El Do-
rado in a condemnation proceeding because Article 1, section 17 of
the Texas Constitution was silent on the matter.65 Therefore, the Leg-
islature must amend the constitution or statutes in order to award at-
torney’s fees in condemnation proceedings.
2. The Bona Fide, Good Faith Offer and
Condemnation Proceedings
Eminent domain proceedings begin with the condemnor offering to
buy or lease the landowner’s property, delivered via certified mail.66
In addition to an offer, the condemnor must send all land appraisals
spanning the previous ten years.67 No later than seven days after this
initial delivery, the condemnor must mail a landowner’s bill of rights
statement to the landowner, pursuant to section 402.031 of the Texas
Government Code.68 The Texas landowner’s bill of rights notifies
landowners that they have the right to: (1) a notice of proposed acqui-
sition of the owner’s property; (2) a bona fide good faith effort by the
entity proposing to acquire the property; (3) an assessment of dam-
ages to the owner that will result from the taking of the property; (4) a
hearing under Chapter 21 of the Texas Property Code, including a
57. See Craig v. Ft. Worth & D.C. Ry. Co., 185 S.W. 944 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort
Worth 1916, writ ref’d).
58. Phillips v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 296 S.W. 877, 880 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1927).
59. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry. Co. of Texas v. Cunningham, 273 S.W. 697 (Tex.
Civ. App.—Amarillo 1925, no writ).
60. See Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Koch, 144 S.W. 1035 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin
1912, no writ).
61. See Kendall v. Chicago, R.I. & G. Ry. Co., 95 S.W. 757 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Dallas 1906, no writ).
62. See Rainey v. Red River, T. & S. Ry. Co., 89 S.W. 768 (Tex. 1905).
63. City of San Antonio v. El Dorado Amusement Co., 195 S.W.3d 238, 249 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2006, pet. denied).
64. Id.; see also New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Tex. Indus. Inc., 414 S.W.2d 914, 915,
(Tex. 1967).
65. City of San Antonio, 195 S.W.3d at 249.
66. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.0111(a) (West 2013).
67. Id.
68. Id. § 21.0112(a) (West 2017).
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hearing to assess damages; and (5) an appeal of a judgement in a con-
demnation proceeding, including an appeal on the assessment of
damages.
Next, the condemnor must engage in a bona fide good faith offer
and attempt to reach an agreement with the landowner.69 The con-
demnor may file a condemnation petition if no agreement is reached.
The condemnor must provide the petition to the landowner via certi-
fied mail.70 The condemnor must file the petition in the county in
which the landowner resides, so long as the landowner resides in a
county where at least part of the property is located.71 If this is not the
case, then the condemnor may file the petition in any county where
part of the land is located.72 After such filing, the judge of the court
appoints three special commissioners to assess damages of the prop-
erty being condemned.73 Each party then has the opportunity to strike
one of the special commissioners, in which case the judge will appoint
a new commissioner.74 Within twenty days, the special commissioners
must schedule a hearing as near to the property as is practical or at the
county seat.75
The landowner must provide any appraisals used to establish the
owner’s opinion of value to the condemnor the earlier of ten days
after the appraisal or three days before the hearing date.76 However,
the statute does not require the condemnor to disclose any such ap-
praisals except for the appraisals originally sent to the landowner with
the bona fide good faith offer.77
III. TEXAS’ OPTIONS TO PROTECT LANDOWNERS ON THE EVE
OF HIGH-SPEED RAIL
A. The Legislative Options
1. Eminent Domain Proceedings
a. Due Notice: Establishing a More Level Playing Field
Landowners and the TCR will likely never be on an equal playing
field—as a large company, the TCR will almost always have more
funds and access to legal expertise than the average condemnee. To
level this playing field, the legislature should err on the side of helping
landowners, in the same way that Texas courts construe statutes in
favor of landowners.
69. Id. § 21.0113 (West 2017).
70. Id. § 21.012 (West 2017).
71. Id. § 21.013(a) (West 2017).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 21.014(a) (West 2017).
74. Id.
75. Id. § 21.015(a) (West 2013).
76. Id. § 21.0111(b) (West 2013).
77. Id. § 21.0111(d).
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The Texas Legislature should consider revamping the condemna-
tion proceedings process. The Texas Property Code requires landown-
ers to disclose their appraisals either ten days after receiving the
appraisal or three days before the condemnation proceeding, which-
ever comes first.78 The condemnor, however, is not subject to any such
requirements. Because condemnors have no requirement to disclose
appraisals prior to hearings, landowners are forced to analyze con-
demning appraisals during hearings. It is effectively a “trial by
ambush.”
This proposal is perhaps the most important one proposed in this
Article because justice requires that condemnees and condemnors are
treated equally during the proceedings. The current law is inconsistent
with the state’s public policy that greatly favors landowners. Allowing
condemnors to withhold appraisal documents until the commissioner’s
court hearings gives condemnors a distinct advantage—establishing
their preferred price in the proceedings. With at least three extra days
to analyze the condemnee’s appraisals, the condemnor has a clear ad-
vantage with more time to identify weaknesses in the condemnee’s
appraisal, discredit the condemnee’s appraiser, and even counter the
condemnee’s appraisal with additional appraisals. Meanwhile, the
condemnee is significantly disadvantaged by being forced to analyze
the condemnor’s appraisal during the hearing.
Texas can look to states like New Jersey for guidance where both
parties are required to disclose the results of their survey fifteen days
before the condemnation proceedings.79 Other states, such as New
Mexico, do not require either of the parties to disclose their appraisals
prior to the hearing.80 Although, New Mexico’s policy is not ideal be-
cause parties must hastily analyze each other’s appraisals; neverthe-
less, it puts both the condemnor and condemnee on equal ground and
is thus more fair than Texas’s policy.
b. Attorney’s Fees: The 120% Rule
The Legislature should also consider requiring condemnors to pay a
condemnee’s attorney’s fees when the land value is 120% of the con-
demnor’s offer. This policy incites condemnors to responsibly use
their authority. The benefit of attorney’s fees extends beyond land-
owners that contest a condemnation; the policy will also mean that
those who accept the condemnor’s offer will likely receive a fair offer
78. Id.
79. Ashley, et al., Law and Policy Resource Guide: A Survey of Eminent Domain
Law in Texas and the Nation, TEX. A&M U. SCH. L. 19 (2015), https://scholarship.law
.tamu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=nrs-publications [https://perma
.cc/8526-BJHR].
80. Id.; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42A-1-5(A)(3) (LexisNexis 1978 & Repl.
Supp. 1994).
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and avoiding the risk of losing attorney’s fees in litigation subsequent
to an undervalued offer.
Without this reform, condemnees who reject the condemnor’s offer
and hire attorneys will not recover the full value of their land. As the
Trans-Pecos Pipeline exemplified, condemnees were offered amounts
that are one-thirtieth of the land’s actual value. In such cases, the con-
demnee cannot recover the full price of his land—the condemnee can
only recover the price awarded, less the attorney’s fees.
In deciding whether to accept the condemnor’s offer, the con-
demnee engages in game theory. On one hand, the condemnee can
take the condemnor’s offer and give up the opportunity to contest the
value of his land. Alternatively, the condemnee can reject the offer
and contest the value of the land. In the second option, the landowner
must also factor in the cost of attorney’s fees—if the land value in-
creases by an amount that is less than the attorney’s fees, the land-
owner will have effectively lost. In order to tactfully incite
condemnors to offer amounts closer to the land’s actual value and to
protect the condemnee, the legislature should consider awarding at-
torney’s fees when the condemnor’s offer is lower than the actual
value by 20% or, another appropriate percentage.
Seventeen other states have statutes that awards attorney’s fees
when offers are lower than the actual value of the property. Of these
states, five award attorney’s fees when the actual value is 110% of the
offer, two do so for 115%, two others for 120%, and one for 130%.81
Meanwhile, six states award attorney’s fees if the land’s actual value is
above the offer by any amount, and one state awards attorney’s fees if
the actual value is closer to the landowner’s attested value than the
condemnor’s attested value.82
Opponents of this proposal may argue that awarding attorney’s fees
would create a plaintiff market and cause excessive litigation. The
Texas government took similar steps to stop plaintiff-lawyer markets
with both the legislative and judicial tort reform actions from
2003–2005.83 The Legislature capped several medical malpractice and
personal injury claims to discourage plaintiffs’ lawyers from pursuing
hefty verdicts needed to support their practice.84 Meanwhile, the
Texas Supreme Court took similar tort reform in several judicial
rulings.85
However, the market for eminent domain lawyers is distinct from
that of medical malpractice and tort lawyers. In eminent domain pro-
ceedings, the condemned land’s value is a solely economic question—
the proceedings exist to establish its value. Meanwhile, one of Texas’s
81. Ashley et al., supra note 78, at 11.
82. Id.
83. David A. Anderson, Judicial Tort Reform in Texas, 26 REV. LITIG. 1, 4 (2007).
84. Id. at 16–17.
85. Id. at 5–13.
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key tort reforms was the limitation of non-economic damages, such as
pain and suffering.86 Eminent domain proceedings are worthy of adju-
dication because the land’s value is inherently economic in nature.
Without this adjudication, the disfavored operation of law may eco-
nomically harm the condemnee.
Additionally, the benefits that awarding attorney’s fees will bring to
condemnees justifies the cost of encouraging adjudication. In fact,
condemnation proceedings are a relatively simple proceeding com-
pared to personal injury and malpractice claims. These claims are typi-
cally full-blown lawsuits; which require discovery, sometimes lengthy
trials, expensive expert witnesses, and more court time and expenses.
Texas’s tort reforms were actually aimed at ending the litigious games-
manship that occurred in these lawsuits.87 Condemnations, on the
other hand, are relatively simple hearings that mainly surround one
question: the value of the land. Additionally, condemnations are in-
herently less common than personal injury cases—while more than
forty Texans are seriously injured on roads each day, there are signifi-
cantly fewer properties condemned per day.88
Finally, the inherent disadvantage vis-a-vis legal expertise and fi-
nancial flexibility that condemnees have when facing condemnors is
the exact opposite of personal injury and malpractice claims. In con-
demnation proceedings, the party defending its land is typically disad-
vantaged because the condemnor is a large entity that performs many
condemnations and has significant financial resources. Conversely, in
tort claims (and especially medical malpractice) claims, the party de-
fending itself is an insurance company that is experienced in defend-
ing these types of suits; while the plaintiff has no experience in this
area. Unlike tort reform, Texas does not have to overlook the interests
of the inherently disadvantaged parties in eminent domain reform, but
instead should help condemnees because they are less likely to have
less legal expertise and financial flexibility.
Awarding attorney’s fees in eminent domain proceedings will bene-
fit rural Texans and help level the already uneven playing field in
Texas eminent domain proceedings by encouraging true good faith of-
fers by condemnors.
86. Joseph Nixon & Texas Public Policy Foundation, Ten Years of Tort Reform in
Texas: A Review, HERITAGE FOUND. (July 26, 2013), https://www.heritage.org/report/
ten-years-tort-reform-texas-review [https://perma.cc/3AF7-V72S].
87. Id.
88. Texas Motor Vehicle Traffic Crash Facts Calendar Year 2017, TEX. DEP’T
TRANSP., https://ftp.dot.state.tx.us/pub/txdot-info/trf/crash_statistics/2017/01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4KX3-XUMB] (last updated Apr. 20, 2018).
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c. Tricking the Landowner: Establishing Honesty
in the “Good Faith” Offer
The Texas Legislature must address another important issue for ru-
ral Texan condemnees: uninformed condemnees accepting offers with-
out a proper understanding of the situation. Texas already has several
requirements for the offer stage of the taking, but none require the
condemnor to specify which parts of the land the condemnor has ac-
tual authority to take. If the condemnee falsely thinks the condemnor
has authority to take more land than authorized, the condemnee can
be tricked into selling more land than if the condemnee were better
informed.
Texas should adopt a policy wherein condemnors must send two of-
fers to landowners: one for all land that the condemnor has the au-
thority to take and a separate one for any land that the condemnor
does not have authority to take. Additionally, each offer should be
labeled as such. Giving landowners this protection will be similar to
Texas’s policies requiring condemnors to notify condemnees of their
rights before the proceedings occur. This could afford more knowl-
edge to condemnees and allows them to make informed decisions
about their rights in the condemnation process.
This policy is based on the layman-condemnee’s lack of understand-
ing of the overall process, compared to the condemnor, who has likely
taken many other properties for the project. This power imbalance,
combined with the condemnor’s presumably superior financial situa-
tion, significantly disadvantages the condemnee. Texas should ensure
that they have access to information regarding which pieces of land
the condemnee is and is not required to give up.
Perhaps this will slow down the condemnation process and lead to
increased litigation, but the policy need only require a small amount
of additional information in a packet sent to the condemnee and will
likely have no effect on condemnation proceedings.
2. Texas Homesteads: A Sensible Expansion
of Homestead Protection
In the 85th Legislative Session, Senate Bill 243 (referred to but
never voted out from the State Affairs Committee) sought to protect
landowners from private entities exercising eminent domain authority
over homesteads and all adjacent property owned by the same
owner.89 The tax code defines a residence homestead as a structure,
and up to twenty acres of land, that is owned through beneficial inter-
est in a trust, built for and used as a human residence, and is the indi-
vidual’s principal residence.90 The bill would have enabled landowners
threatened with condemnation to file a petition to dismiss the con-
89. Tex. S.B. 243, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017).
90. TEX. TAX CODE § 11.13(j) (West 2013 & Supp. 2018).
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demnation action, which would then approved by a majority of the
special commissioners.91 After approval, the condemnation action
would be dismissed.92 Of note, this bill would give license to, but not
require, the special commissioners to dismiss the condemnation
action.
While the bill aims to protect Texas homesteads, the policy con-
tained therein may make it unlikely that a high-speed rail could be
constructed in Texas. The bill would allow any private entity’s eminent
domain authority to be blocked by a quasi-jury of three judge-ap-
pointed real property owners (i.e., the Texas special commissioners).
Specifically, the problem is that the homestead, together with any ad-
jacent land owned by the same owner, could stretch for miles, instead
of being limited to the twenty acres contained in the homestead. How-
ever, Texas has repeatedly shown favor towards family-owned prop-
erty used for residential purposes and for this reason, the Legislature
should not abandon homestead protections against eminent domain.
Accordingly, this bill should be rewritten to dismiss of a private en-
tity’s condemnation proceeding only when the adjudicated land is a
homestead. First, such a rule would allow private entities to continue
exercising eminent domain authority without the possibility of rogue
special commissioner’s courts in certain counties blocking their pro-
ject entirely. If the Legislature wants to block the high-speed rail, it
should do so directly, and not in a roundabout way. Second, allowing
special commissioner’s courts to selectively protect areas of no more
than twenty acres is a very reasonable approach because dismissing
those plots of land that are no more than twenty acres will happen
infrequently and are unlikely to affect the high-speed rail’s overall
feasibility. In short, this policy would be extremely beneficial for land-
owners and have a negligible effect on condemnors.
3. Pulling the Brakes: An Outright Block of High-Speed Rail
Federal courts granted Texas the absolute authority to block the
high-speed rail’s eminent domain authority. However, some laws pro-
posed in the Legislature would subtly block the high-speed rail with-
out the public’s knowledge. The Legislature has a duty to be open in
the legislative process. Therefore, it should weigh the pros and cons of
stopping the high-speed rail in a clear and transparent manner.
For this reason, the most honest way to revoke the TCR’s eminent
domain authority requires amending Texas Transportation Code sec-
tion 112 to specifically state that any high-speed rail company in-
tended to operate rail services with speeds greater than 120 miles per
hour is not considered a railroad company.93 This would effectively
91. Tex. S.B. 243, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017).
92. Id.
93. Tex. H.B. 2161, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017).
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strip the TCR of its apparent eminent domain authority and com-
pletely block the project in a direct, transparent, and non-disguised
way.
Whether the legislature should block the high-speed rail is a ques-
tion better answered in a more policy-focused article.
B. The Judicial Derail
Some in Texas have argued, however, that the TCR is not a railway
at all because the TCR lacks any rail cars, rail lines, or passengers.94 If
the TCR is not a railroad under Texas law, the project is likely dead in
its tracks.95 The Texas Transportation Code defines railroad as any
railroad incorporated before September 1, 2007—which the TCR was
not—or “any other legal entity operating a railroad. . . .”96 Legislative
history gives no apparent insight as to what the Texas Legislature in-
tended by the word operating.
This ambiguity, combined with the Texas courts’ longstanding tradi-
tion to construe statutes in favor of the landowner, may result in the
courts adopting an approach that the state can eminent domain au-
thority to corporations operating a physical railroad. Some lawmakers
are pushing for this ruling, but it is unlikely for three reasons.
First, a ruling that the TCR is not a railroad would be absurd and
thus likely outside the statute’s plain meaning. The Texas Supreme
Court will find a statute’s intent through its plain meaning.97 Such a
statute will not be construed according to the plain meaning, however,
if the result of that plain meaning is absurd.98 The petitioner’s argu-
ment—that the TCR is not a railroad because it does not operate a
railroad—can be easily be countered by the absurd outcome. If this
was indeed what the legislature intended, then the TCR could become
a railroad by building a small track and operating a train on it. Such a
track, under the petitioner’s argument, could feasibly be as little as
100 feet long. The TCR’s argument is that it would be absurd to con-
clude that the legislature intended for every prospective railroad to
create a small track to operate on to gain eminent domain authority.
Second, this argument is also unlikely to be the true legislative in-
tent because it imposes undue financial burdens and obstacles on star-
tup railroad companies. No reasonable interpretation would force
each company to create a semi-useless railroad before it can gain the
rights and privileges of being a true railroad.
94. Brandon Formby, “Come and Take it”: Eminent Domain Dispute at Heart of




96. TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 81.002 (West 2009 & Supp. 2018).
97. McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 747 (Tex. 2003).
98. City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625–26 (Tex. 2008).
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Third, the TCR’s argument,99 that it is operating a railroad under
the statute because it has many employees and operates an entire cor-
poration with the purpose of constructing and operating a railroad
aligns within a statute’s plain meaning. This supports the argument
because subsection (1) of the relevant provision indicates that rail-
roads are a type of company—not a physical railroad—by its language
“a railroad incorporated. . . .” Railroads cannot be incorporated; only
railroad companies can be incorporated. Thus, the TCR will argue
that the likely meaning of subsection (2) is that eminent domain
power is granted to corporations that have a railroad operation in
some capacity of their business, whether that operation is a physical or
through the planning phases of a railroad.
The judicial solution that opponents of the rail may bring against
the TCR is unlikely to occur. However, strong judicial activism may
aid petitioners in their bout to end the TCR’s project. Texas’s elected
judiciary gives this a better chance, but in all, the project is unlikely to
be blocked through the judiciary.
IV. CONCLUSION
As Texas grapples with a potential high-speed railway, the state has
a tremendous opportunity to reform its eminent domain policies. The
state’s courts have recognized the harsh nature of eminent domain,
and the electorate of Texas has approved a constitutional amendment
that restricted the use of eminent domain by nullifying Kelo in favor
of the landowners. Now, the legislature can make significant strides in
protecting the rights of individual landowners throughout eminent do-
main proceedings.
First, the Legislature should consider putting the condemnor and
condemnee on a level playing field by aligning when each party must
disclose its appraisals of the condemned land. Second, legislators
should address whether attorney’s fees should be awarded to con-
demnees if the condemnor’s offer is twenty or more percent less than
what the land is actually worth. Third, the Legislature should resolve
whether condemnors may submit offers to condemnees that do not
specify which areas of land that the condemnor has authority to con-
demn. Fourth, the twenty-acre Texas homesteads should be protected
from eminent domain use. Fifth, if the Legislature wants to block the
high-speed rail outright, as some legislators support, the legislator
should do so in a straightforward way. Last, opponents of the rail have
proposed judicial interpretations that would block the rail entirely,
but these interpretations are unlikely to prevail.
99. Formby, supra note 93.
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